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ABSTRACT
Prognostics applications predict the future evolution of an
asset under study, by diagnosing the actual health state and
modeling the future degradation. Due to rapidly growing
interest in prognostics, different prediction techniques have
been developed independently without a consistent and sys-
tematic design. In this paper we formalize the prognostics de-
sign process with a novel methodology entitled ADEPS (As-
sisted Design for Engineering Prognostic Systems). ADEPS
combines prognostics concepts with model-based safety as-
sessment, criticality analysis, knowledge engineering and for-
mal verification approaches. The main activities of ADEPS
include synthesis of the safety assessment model from the de-
sign model, prioritization of the system failure modes, sys-
tematic prognostics model selection and verification of the
adequacy of the prognostics results with respect to design re-
quirements. By linking system-level safety assessment mod-
els and prognostics results, design and safety models are up-
dated with online information about different failure modes.
This step enables system-level health assessment including
prognostics predictions of different failure modes. The end-
to-end application of the methodology for the design and eval-
uation of a power transformer demonstrates the benefits of
the proposed approach including reduced design time and ef-
fort, complete consideration of prognostics algorithms and
updated system-level health assessment.
1. INTRODUCTION
Prognostics is the ability to acquire knowledge about events
before they actually occur (Vachtsevanos, Lewis, Roemer,
Hess, & Wu, 2007). In engineering, failure prognostics is
aimed at foretelling the Remaining Useful Life (RUL) of an
asset taking into account the likely future evolution of its fail-
ure mode(s). Successful implementations of prognostic tech-
niques provide benefits for maintenance planning and cost-
effective operation of assets (Vachtsevanos et al., 2007).
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Model-based systems engineering concepts provide mecha-
nisms which can simplify the process of designing suitable
prognostics systems for engineering applications (Ramos, Fer-
reira, & Barcelo, 2012). On the one hand, the systems en-
gineering viewpoint integrates a holistic perspective of the
problem, which takes into account asset interrelationships and
lifecycle design requirements. On the other hand, models
play an important role in the system design process because
they are able to (Rumbaugh, Jacobson, & Booch, 1999):
• Capture and state requirements and domain knowledge.
• Organize, examine and edit information of large systems.
• Explore feasibility of alternative solutions.
• Master complex systems.
Many of the current industrial systems address multiple fail-
ure modes and their impact on the overall system performance
may be very different (Espiritu, Coit, & Prakash, 2007). Ac-
cordingly, prognostics implementations of some failure modes
will be more cost effective than others. Therefore the selec-
tion of an adequate prognostics technique depends on the fail-
ure mode justification according to the system design.
After the failure mode selection, it is necessary to choose an
adequate prognostics model among the available techniques.
So as to reduce the time and effort required to develop an ac-
curate prognostics application we implement knowledge en-
gineering concepts which aid in the systematic prognostics
model selection process according to design requirements.
In order to avoid undesirable consequences and for correct
maintenance planning, prognostics results need to be verified
against the prognostics design requirements.
Often the system-level failure is not caused by the isolated
failure occurrence of a single failure mode, but due to the si-
multaneous occurrence of interacting failure modes (Daigle,
Bregon, & Roychoudhury, 2014). Accordingly, from the sys-
tem - level perspective, it is possible to integrate independent
component-level prognostics applications in the overall sys-
tem design process for system-level health assessment.
Integrating all these concepts in the design flow, in this paper
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we present a novel methodology entitled ADEPS (Assisted
Design for Engineering Prognostic Systems). The main goal
of ADEPS is the systematic design of prognostics applica-
tions, by choosing a priori an adequate prognostics algorithm
that meets the system requirements. We organize all the pro-
posed activities around a system design model which acts as
the core model for prognostics studies and system design.
In previous work we focused on the systematic prognostics
model selection process (Aizpurua & Catterson, 2015b) and
formal verification of prognostics results (Aizpurua & Cat-
terson, 2015a). The main contribution of this paper is the
conception of ADEPS for the end-to-end design of prognos-
tics applications starting from component-level analysis up
to the system-level health assessment. The application of
the set of interconnected approaches within ADEPS enables
the systematic design of prognostics applications, verifica-
tion of design requirements with prognostics prediction re-
sults and evaluation of the impact of prognostics predictions
at the system-level.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 presents the state-of-the-art analysing existing prognostics
methodologies. Section 3 defines the ADEPS methodology
and the activities undertaken within the methodology. Section
4 presents the case study to design prognostics applications
for power transformers. Finally, Section 5 draws conclusions.
2. RELATED WORK
In recent years a plethora of new techniques have been pro-
posed for prognostics of engineering assets. In this context of
independent and rapid evolution of prognostics techniques,
there have been some attempts to organise prognostics design
steps with a common design thread.
(Uckun, Goebel, & Lucas, 2008) identified the need for a uni-
versal methodology to design prognostics and health manage-
ment systems and listed some of the key activities of ADEPS.
Some of these steps have been formalized by others: transfor-
mation from high-level requirements to business case (Saxena
et al., 2012); metric selection (Saxena et al., 2008); and vali-
dation and verification tests (Tang, Orchard, Goebel, & Vacht-
sevanos, 2011). A key step that the methodology must inte-
grate is the quantification of metrics as a means to consis-
tently compare alternative techniques.
(Cocheteux, Voisin, Levrat, & Iung, 2009) presented require-
ments for prognostics design including failure mode selection
and prognostics model selection. To select failure modes the
concept of FMAP (Failure Mode Analysis for Prognostics)
is presented, which is inspired from the traditional FMECA
(Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis) (US Depart-
ment of Defense, 1980) including influential variables, ob-
servable indicators and properties. No explicit approach is
proposed for prognostics model selection and for requirements
validation. The approach is continued in (Cocheteux, Voisin,
Levrat, & Iung, 2010) emphasizing system-level performance
indicators for supporting proactive maintenance strategies.
Some prognostics methodologies limit their applicability to
specific prognostics prediction models: (Kumar, Torres, Chan,
& Pecht, 2008) focuses on hybrid prognostics models; and
similarly, (Peysson et al., 2009) formalizes the system spec-
ification for multi component systems, but it lacks a prog-
nostic model selection process. Instead of focusing on a spe-
cific prognostics algorithm which may work for some specific
scenarios, a prognostics model selection process is needed
for the general applicability of a prognostics methodology.
There are other approaches which have considered the prog-
nostics model selection process. For instance, (Lee, Liao,
Lapira, Ni, & Li, 2009) presented a methodology for the de-
sign of e-manufacturing systems. It ranks prognostics algo-
rithms based on process properties and implements the high-
est ranked technique. However, the prognostics techniques
considered are a subset of data-driven techniques and they do
not include model-based and hybrid prognostics techniques.
(Bousdekis, Magoutas, Apostolou, & Mentzas, 2015) does
not present a methodology, but they address the model selec-
tion concept. They select a subset of prognostics techniques,
characterize them in terms of available input and desirable
outputs, knowledge of the degradation process, and domain
knowledge embedded in a utility function. Subsequently they
fed this information into a decision tree learning algorithm so
as to obtain a prognostics model-selection tree.
Although the need to develop a generally applicable method-
ology has been recognized in the literature, most of the pro-
posed prognostics methodologies do not consider a holistic
system viewpoint. Some have confined the application of the
methodology to specific prognostics algorithms, preventing
the generalization of the approach. Some of the proposed
approaches have used a particular solution technique (e.g.,
(Kumar et al., 2008)), while others have not considered the
problem in the context of a methodology (e.g., (Bousdekis et
al., 2015)).
In the area of maintenance modeling, there have been method-
ologies focused on the systems engineering viewpoint so as
to implement lifecycle maintenance concepts (Takata et al.,
2004). For instance, (Ruin, Levrat, Iung, & Despujols, 2014)
presented an engineering centered methodology for the quan-
tification of complex maintenance programs.
However, there is no generally applicable methodology which
suggests a prognostic technique according to the user require-
ments, verifies that the obtained results are coherent with the
design requirements and re-evaluates the impact of the re-
sults at the system-level. Therefore, the main originality of
ADEPS arises from the systematic integration of these activ-
ities through model-based systems engineering, knowledge
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engineering, safety engineering and formal verification ap-
proaches taking into account prognostics-specific constraints.
3. ADEPS METHODOLOGY: ASSISTED DESIGN FOR
ENGINEERING PROGNOSTIC SYSTEMS
ADEPS focuses on model-based systems engineering con-
cepts and integrates the following properties:
• Design of monitoring system architectures including dif-
ferent design options, e.g., number and type of sensors.
• Failure mode and prognostics model selection guidance.
• Formal verification of the resulting prognostics systems.
• Prognostics-updated system-level health assessment.
ADEPS links system-level design with the design of failure-
mode specific prognostics applications through model-based
safety assessment (Joshi, Heimdahl, Miller, & Whalen, 2006;
Papadopoulos et al., 2011) and prognostics-specific activities
(Aizpurua & Catterson, 2015b, 2015a). Besides, we add the
capability to update the system-level perspective using prog-
nostics information. Figure 1 shows the ADEPS methodol-
ogy including different modeling and analysis activities.
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Figure 1. ADEPS methodology.
The methodology starts from the system design model spec-
ification. This model specifies the functional behavior of the
system describing dependencies and nominal operation of sys-
tem components. It is comprised of connected components
via input and output ports. Simulink (MathWorks, 2016) and
SysML (Weilkiens, 2011) are two examples of well-known
model-based system design specification languages. In this
paper we focus on Simulink for subsequent tool support for
model-based safety assessment (see Subsection 3.1), but it is
possible to repeat the same process using other approaches.
We extend the system design model with failure specifica-
tions, defining for the system design components all possible
deviations from normal operation. The failure specification
defines for each component its internal failure modes and the
relation between input and internal failure modes, i.e., fail-
ure propagation logic. The failure propagation logic speci-
fies the failure responses of a component to its input failure
modes. Figure 2a shows two assets with failure propagation
and failure transformation properties: Asset1 propagates the
input failure mode FMA to the output port, whereas Asset2
transforms FMA into another failure mode FMB.
Out1
Asset1
In1
Internal Failure 1
FMA
Asset2
Internal Failure 2
FMA FMB
Out1In1
(a) Example System
FMA
Asset1 Asset2
Internal
Failure 2
System Failure
(b) Example System
Figure 2. Example system: (a) failure propagation and trans-
formation; (b) FTA synthesis.
Component output responses can be specified with relation-
ships between input failure modes and internal failure events
(Papadopoulos et al., 2011):
output FM−out1=Logic(internal fail, input FM−in1) (1)
where input FM−in1 covers the input failure mode(s) (resp.
output) of the component at port in1, internal fail denotes
internal failure events and Logic links failure modes using the
boolean and temporal logic functions displayed in Table 1.
Table 1. Logic gates.
Logic Logic Function Behavior Symbol
Y=AND(A,B) If A occurs and B occurs, then Y occurs
Y=OR(A,B) If A occurs or B occurs, then Y occurs
Y=PAND(A,B) If A occurs before the occurrence of B or
at the same time, then Y occurs
Y=DURd(A) If A occurs for longer or equal than dtime units, then Y occurs
3
EUROPEAN CONFERENCE OF THE PROGNOSTICS AND HEALTH MANAGEMENT SOCIETY 2016
For instance, we can annotate the example system in Figure
2a with the failure specification shown in Table 2, where out-
put deviations are defined according to Eq. (1).
Table 2. Failure specification of the components in Figure 2a.
Comp. Internal FM Output DeviationsOutput
FM Logical Causes
Asset 1 Internal Failure 1 FMA-Out1 FMA
Asset 2 Internal Failure 2 FMB-Out1 OR(FMA-In1,Internal Failure 2)
After specifying all the system components with their corre-
sponding failure behavior, the extended model is analysed by
applying Model-Based Safety Assessment (MBSA) concepts.
This process results in the automatic synthesis of safety mod-
els from the extended design model. The MBSA paradigm
enables the automatic transformation of the design model into
a safety assessment model in order to evaluate the influence
of alternative design decisions on system failure probability
(Joshi et al., 2006; Papadopoulos et al., 2011).
In this paper we focus on Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) mod-
els (Vesely, Dugan, Fragola, Minarick, & Railsback, 2002)
for the system safety model specification although other tools
may also be suitable. The FTA model defines the effect of
failure modes on the system-level failure expressed with (tem-
poral) combinatorial logic (cf. Table 1). The lowest level
basic-events model captures all possible failure modes of the
system under study and at the highest level the top-event mod-
els the system failure occurrence through the combination of
basic events. Assuming that the system in Figure 2a is anno-
tated with the failure specification shown in Table 2, Figure
2b shows the automatically synthesized FTA model.
Applying criticality assessment techniques on the FTA model
(Van der Borst & Schoonakker, 2001), we sort asset fail-
ure modes according to their criticality. These ranked fail-
ure modes are then connected with the fault coverage step
to select a failure mode for prognostics studies. The fail-
ure mode selection is performed according to the criticality
of the failure mode, requirements specification and available
engineering resources, i.e., run-to-failure data or knowledge
of physics-of-failure model (see Subsection 3.2).
Subsequently we undertake the prognostics model selection
according to the process presented in (Aizpurua & Catter-
son, 2015b). For the selected failure mode, we analyse prog-
nostics requirements and available engineering resources (see
Subsection 3.3). Once we select the prognostics model, this
model is used to perform different predictions and estimate
the remaining useful life of the asset under study.
In order to verify the adequacy of the model with respect to
design requirements, we implement the prognostics verifica-
tion approach based on formal verification concepts (Aizpurua
& Catterson, 2015a). The verification step includes the effect
of the possible failures arising from the data acquisition hard-
ware architecture (see Subsection 3.4).
If the selected prognostics model does not meet the prognos-
tics requirements, the designer may need to reconsider design
decisions. Revision of design requirements may result in the
reconsideration of failure mode selection, prognostics model-
selection or verification activities. Otherwise, if the designed
model meets requirements, it is possible to update the system
design and failure models with up-to-date health assessment
information via prognostics prediction results (see Subsection
3.5). The designer can repeat the process with other failure
modes, establishing a set of prognostics prediction models for
the different failure modes of the system under study.
3.1. Model-Based Safety Assessment
Model-Based Safety Assessment (MBSA) aids in the design
process of safety-related systems (Papadopoulos et al., 2011;
Joshi et al., 2006). Namely, it enables the (automatic) synthe-
sis of safety assessment models from operational design mod-
els. This process has advantages such as alleviating the need
for creating architecture-specific safety models manually for
each design alternative. As a result, MBSA introduces a shift
in the design process from being manual, tedious and failure-
prone towards an automated and reusable approach.
The integration of MBSA concepts within ADEPS enables
to frame from a system-level perspective the design of prog-
nostics applications. This is achieved through safety models
which define how the combination of different failure modes
cause the system failure. In turn, for each of these failure
modes, it is possible to design a prognostics model system-
atically according to ADEPS. MBSA plays a pivotal role in
ADEPS by providing a centralized system design framework.
The design and safety models evolve dynamically to include
design decisions adopted at different stages and prognostics
results obtained at different prediction times. On the one
hand, ADEPS makes use of the synthesized safety models
to rank failure modes according to their criticality. This way,
any architectural design decision will impact the underlying
safety model, and it will affect the criticality analysis, failure
mode ranking and prognostics model selection. On the other
hand, the links between safety and prognostics models enable
the continuous update of safety models with prognostics re-
sults. As a result, the designer obtains an up-to-date (system-
level) health assessment including future degradation trends.
There are different MBSA approaches which extract different
analysis models from design specifications (see (Aizpurua &
Muxika, 2013) for an overview). In this paper we use the HiP-
HOPS approach because it provides flexibility and support for
specifying the design model and extracting (temporal) FTA
models (Papadopoulos et al., 2011). As shown in Figure 3,
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the specification of the design model in HiP-HOPS is done
with hierarchical block diagrams which can include different
design alternatives (e.g., alternative redundancy strategies).
Figure 3. System design, failure annotations and Fault Tree
synthesis step in HiP-HOPS.
For each component in the design model its failure behav-
ior is specified including internal malfunctions and the logic
that links internal failures with the incoming failures (see Eq.
(1) and Figure 3). HiP-HOPS takes the design model with
failure annotations and analyses the failure propagation logic
from basic causes to the system-level failure occurrence. The
component connections in the design model with the failure
propagation logic enable the automated synthesis of FMECA
and FTA models from the extended system design model.
3.2. Fault Coverage
Engineering systems are comprised of different assets which
work in cooperation to perform a system-level function. Each
of these assets has different failure modes which have a dif-
ferent impact on the system-level failure occurrence. Prog-
nostics applications may prioritize a single fault type, aging
behaviour or a number of important failure modes. The fault
coverage activity focuses on failure mode selection to design
a prognostics model.
In the proposed methodology the failure mode selection is
driven by three parameters: criticality of the failure mode,
available engineering resources for the failure mode under
study and design requirements. Ideally all the necessary engi-
neering resources (run-to-failure data and/or physics of fail-
ure models) for all the failure modes of the system will be
available for the designer. Given the open choice to select a
failure mode for prognostics studies, we focus on the extrac-
tion of indicators to assist in the failure mode selection.
The failure mode criticality has been considered as a use-
ful design indicator for prognostics failure mode selection.
FMECA is a valid approach for criticality assessment and
failure mode selection (e.g., (Uckun et al., 2008), (Cocheteux
et al., 2009)). However, FMECA is a qualitative cause-effect
approach which requires a thorough understanding of the fail-
ure mechanisms. Even with a perfect understanding of the
failure modes, sometimes it is difficult to determine the criti-
cality of failure modes due to intermediate events.
FTA is an effect-cause approach which can integrate qualita-
tive and quantitative assessments. If the link between basic
events and top-event failure occurrence is identified, it has
potential to automate the criticality analysis through impor-
tance measurements (Van der Borst & Schoonakker, 2001).
Accordingly we can classify failure modes into two groups:
• Critical failure modes: system breakdown occurs when
the component failure mode occurs.
• Non-critical failure modes: system breakdown does not
occur when the component failure mode occurs.
According to this logic we use the FTA model so as to weight
the contribution of each component to the system-level failure
occurrence. Namely, we evaluate when the occurrence of a
failure mode causes the system-level failure and extract the
failure criticality index (Hilber, 2008): the ratio between the
number of system failures caused by the failure mode to the
total number of system failures.
After ranking all the failure modes with respect to their crit-
icality, we select the most critical one and check if there are
engineering resources available for this failure mode. If there
are engineering resources, we proceed with the next activity
of the methodology. However, if there are no resources, we
take the next ordered failure mode until finding a failure mode
with available engineering resources.
This fault coverage process assures the prognostics assess-
ment of the most critical failure mode for which there are
available engineering resources.
3.3. Prognostics Model Selection
Prognostics prediction models can be classified into the fol-
lowing high-level groups: data-driven, model-based and hy-
brid approaches (Aizpurua & Catterson, 2015b).
The selection of the group depends on the available engineer-
ing resources. Namely, when run-to-failure data or knowl-
edge of the system’s degradation equation is available, data-
driven or model-based approaches are selected respectively.
When both engineering resources are available, the selection
of the high-level group incurs a trade-off decision between the
availability of statistically significant run-to-failure data and
complexity of the degradation equation. If the complexity
is manageable and there is enough run-to-failure data hybrid
prognostics techniques can be selected.
In (Aizpurua & Catterson, 2015b) we presented ordered de-
sign decision points to choose a prognostics model using the
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failure mode under study, design requirements and available
engineering resources. The decision points for each of the
high-level groups are different (Aizpurua & Catterson, 2015b):
• Data-driven: RUL format, data monotonicity, prediction
horizon, knowledge of degradation states, availability of
expert knowledge, Markovian degradation process anal-
ysis, availability of multiple run-to-failure data. . .
• Model-based: availability of observations, linearity of
the degradation trend, assumptions about Gaussian noise.
• Hybrid: availability of expert knowledge, complemen-
tary parameter estimation, combination of features.
Data-driven approaches include more decision points because
there are simply more of these techniques to choose between.
Model-based techniques are more specific to the field of study.
Namely, physics of failure models are specifically designed
to predict the degradation of a particular failure mode. Hy-
brid prognostics models include the systematic combination
of data-driven and model-based prognostics techniques with
complementary properties.
We organize these decision points strategically in different
flowcharts so as to aid the designer in the prognostics model-
selection process according to design requirements and avail-
able engineering resources—please see (Aizpurua & Catter-
son, 2015b) for the exhaustive list of design decision points.
3.4. Verification of Prognostics Requirements
The verification of prognostics applications is crucial for build-
ing trust in their predictions. Prognostics engineering lit-
erature suggests prognostics metrics for the evaluation and
verification of the correctness, timeliness, and confidence of
prognostics models (Saxena et al., 2008). The quantifica-
tion of these metrics requires case-by-case implementation of
their logic with each application. A requirements verification
technique which is model independent would assist in doing
this task semi-automatically for any prognostics model.
Furthermore, online prognostics applications depend on a data
acquisition hardware architecture to generate correct prog-
nostics predictions. Accordingly, when verifying prognostics
requirements compliance, it is necessary to include the effect
of hardware failures on prognostics predictions.
We use formal verification techniques for the integrated ver-
ification of prognostics applications including hardware and
software components. Figure 4 shows the overall verifica-
tion approach (Aizpurua & Catterson, 2015a). We define a
probabilistic model-checking pattern which is used to syn-
thesize prognostics prediction results, asset information and
the data architecture specification. This pattern is formally
expressed with prognostics requirements. The probabilistic
model-checking engine performs an exhaustive verification
to check if the requirements are satisfied by the prognostics
pattern. If satisfied, the results can be used as argumentation
of verified design requirements.
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Specifications
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Figure 4. Verification activity of the methodology.
In this paper, we use the PRISM tool (Kwiatkowska, Nor-
man, & Parker, 2011) for the implementation of probabilistic
model-checking concepts, but other tools may also be appli-
cable. PRISM enables the specification of state-based proba-
bilistic models including continuous and discrete time Markov
chains, Markov decision processes, probabilistic timed au-
tomata and Markov decision processes. Among these for-
malisms we use Continuous-Time Markov Chains (CTMC)
for the specification of the prognostics pattern and we use
Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL) for the verification of
system requirements—see (Aizpurua & Catterson, 2015a) for
the rationale and limits of the selected approach.
Figure 5 shows the probabilistic model-checking prognostics
pattern which is specified as a CTMC in PRISM (Aizpurua &
Catterson, 2015a).
L1:Data Architecture HW
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ToffTM 3:Asset
M asset
λassetW FM TM
...F
λ1
1
W F
λ2
2
W F
λN
N
W
2:Prediction
λHW
λHW
Tp
OffToff
HW
down
Pred
 HW
Figure 5. Probabilistic model-checking prognostics pattern.
The probabilistic model-checking pattern takes as input:
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• Specification of the data architecture hardware includ-
ing the combination of component failures that cause the
system failure, i.e. Minimal Cut Set (MCS) (Vesely et
al., 2002) and failure (λ) and repair rate (µ) values of
system components.
• Prognostics prediction results including the prognostics
prediction time (Tp) and RUL estimation.
• Information on the asset under study including ground
truth data (λAsset), mean time to repair the asset (µAsset)
and periodic preventive maintenance period (Tprev).
The MCS defines the performance of the data acquisition
hardware (λHW, µHW). Under nominal conditions, the pre-
diction module performs predictions at different instants Tp.
The result of these predictions is the estimation of the RUL,
which in turn, can be transformed into a maintenance inter-
val TM taking into account a Safety Factor (SF): TM=RUL-
SF. After each prediction, the prediction module goes back
to Off state with time Toff. The asset module takes into ac-
count ground truth data and it is repaired after a constant time
interval.
At every prognostics prediction instant we update pattern pa-
rameters with prognostics prediction results. Then we verify
if requirements are met via probabilistic model-checking. Re-
quirements are formally expressed using the CSL formalism
as a function of the parameters in Figure 5. The outcome of
the verification of prognostics results is the quantification of
prognostics metrics.
CSL formulas are interpreted over the states of the CTMC to
check if the stated formula is satisfied (Katoen, Kwiatkowska,
Norman, & Parker, 2001). The main operators for property
specification are: P for the specification of the probability that
the observed execution of the model satisfies a given spec-
ification; S to compute steady-state probabilities; and R to
express reward-based properties. The P operator is used in
conjunction with temporal operators defined over a state or a
path of the CTMC model.
The main operators for temporal state or path specifications
are: G for properties that need to be satisfied globally, F for
properties that become true eventually, X for properties that
become true in the next state and U for properties that are not
satisfied until another property is true.
The S operator is used to reason about the steady-state oper-
ation and it has no timed-variants. As for the R operator it is
possible to combine it with F for reachability properties, C
for cumulative properties, and I for instantaneous properties.
All these operators have time-bounded extensions. Table 3
displays some examples of formal properties expressed in
CSL and their informal meaning. Note that prop denotes
property, which is a condition defined over the CTMC model,
e.g. in Figure 5: prop=(Prediction=Off∧ Asset=F).
Table 3. Examples of CSL properties.
# CSL Meaning
1 P=?[F<t prop1] Prob. of prop1 is true eventually before t
2 P=?[G[t1 ,t2] prop1] Prob. globally prop1 is true within thetime instant [t1 , t2]
3 P=?[prop1 U<=t prop2] Prob. of prop2 not being true until prop1is not true in the interval [0,t]
4 R{”oper”}=? [C<=t] Expected cumulative operational time
5 R{”time”}=? [F prop] Accumulated time until prop is satisfied
We can define conditions (rewards) in PRISM to evaluate
False Positive (FP) and False Negative (FN) metrics. As-
suming that asset=1 identifies failed state, asset=2 identifies
maintenance state, pred=2 identifies hardware down state in
the prediction module, and CIx identifies the confidence in-
terval of the event X, where X={FP, FN}; we define the fol-
lowing conditions:
FN=(asset=1)∧(RUL+Tp>λAsset−CIFN )∨(pred=2) (2)
FP =(asset=2)∧(λAsset−(RUL+Tp))> (CIFP ) (3)
When reward Equations (2) and (3) are satisfied by the prog-
nostics pattern in Figure 5, they will be increased by a unit
quantifying the occurrence of these events.
3.5. Update System Design with Prognostics Results
Traditionally MBSA is used early in the design phase, whereas
prognostics predictions are performed after the asset is de-
ployed for some time. However, it is possible to align both
approaches by updating the extended design model and safety
model parameters according to prognostics prediction results
at different prediction time instants. The main benefit of this
step is the up-to-date consideration of the system health state
including prognostics prediction results.
Prognostics results (i.e., RUL estimations) can be seen as ran-
dom variables which can be categorized into three groups:
• A deterministic value.
• A deterministic value ± a confidence interval.
• A probability density function.
These values can be used for failure specification or analysis
of maintenance strategies. For failure specification, prognos-
tics predictions constitute the basic failure unit of the fail-
ure mode or asset under study. It is possible to propagate
these values for further reliability evaluations using high level
approaches such as FTA. To this end, it is necessary to pa-
rameterize prognostics results with an equivalent Probability
Density Function (PDF). The deterministic RUL can be ap-
proximated with the exponential distribution calculating the
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bounds for the confidence interval (Banjevic & Jardine, 2006).
As for RUL results specified as a PDF, they can be approxi-
mated using a parameterized PDF with regression techniques.
After the parameterization, it is possible to recompute the sys-
tem level failure probability through the FTA model. To this
end, the failure specification of the failure modes needs to be
updated through conditional probabilities. There are analytic
formulations that integrate conditional probability functions,
e.g., Bayes theory (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 2003).
There are also simulation based approaches which can up-
date distribution parameters during simulation, e.g., Stochas-
tic Activity Networks (SAN) (Sanders & Meyer, 2001).
4. CASE STUDY
Power transformers are important assets in electrical power
grids with a direct impact on the reliability of the grid. The
main goal of power transformers is to transfer the electric en-
ergy from one voltage level to another under magnetic induc-
tion reaction. One of its main benefits is the reduction of
power transmission cost by increasing the transmission volt-
age and reducing the required current for transmission.
The main components of the transformer are the tank, wind-
ing, core, tap changer and bushings. The tank is the assembly
and physical protection for the active part of the transformer,
i.e. winding and core. Winding is a conductor material which
aims to satisfy the increase in power rating and voltage re-
quirements. Windings are arranged as shells around the core,
where each strand is wrapped with insulation paper. Core is a
magnetic circuit which reduces core losses. Tap changer reg-
ulates the voltage level by transferring electrical power from
one tap winding to the adjacent one and bushings are the elec-
trical isolation between tank and windings. The failure of any
of these components can cause the transformer failure.
Transformers are the most expensive assets in the power net-
work with a costly and time-consuming repair process. As
a result, the implementation of condition-based maintenance
strategies through prognostics is a potential solution to ex-
tending their useful life. The tank is a cornerstone part of
the power transformer design, but its degradation can be as-
sessed easily with visual inspection. The winding is a criti-
cal subsystem of the transformer which initiates most of the
transformer failure events and its health assessment requires
investigation of all root causes (CIGR ´E, 2015). As a result,
in this case study we will focus on the winding analysis.
Figure 6a shows high-level dependencies between the trans-
former and its data acquisition hardware system. The data
acquisition hardware system monitors the generated current
and temperature of the winding circuit (see Subsection 4.4).
Figure 6b shows the block diagram of the active part of the
transformer. The winding generates a magnetic flux which
travels within the core. The core increases efficiency and it
provides an effective magnetic flux. The winding provides
as output effective output current at the designed level and
circuit temperature for monitoring purposes.
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Figure 6. Transformer design: (a) high-level dependencies;
(b) active part of the transformer; (c) winding block diagram.
Figure 6c shows the winding block diagram. The oil and pa-
per act as insulators materials for the winding. The cooling
system keeps the oil temperature at acceptable levels and the
paper insulation degradation process depends on the oil tem-
perature (CIGR ´E, 2015). The paper acts as an insulation ma-
terial of the winding circuit which produces a magnetic flux
to which travels through the core and an output current which
is produced using the effective magnetic flux.
4.1. Model-based Safety Assessment (MBSA)
In order to apply the MBSA concepts, first we extend the de-
sign model in Figure 6c with failure annotations. Table 4
displays the functional failure modes and their deviations.
Figure 7 shows the propagated failure modes after annotating
the winding design model in Figure 6c with failure deviations
in Table 4.
After adding the failure specifications (which are subject to
expert knowledge) to the design model, we synthesize auto-
matically from Figure 7 the winding FTA model shown in
Figure 8 via HiP-HOPS.
Winding failure (or equivalently Omission-Magn. Flux event)
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Table 4. Failure specification of the winding subsystem — cf. Figure 6c.
Component Internal FM
Output Deviations
Output FM Logical Causes
Cooling Pump Failure Omission-Cool Temp. Pump Failure
Oil Low Oil Level,Moisture PaperDegradation-Oil Temp.
OR(Omission-Cool Temp., Low Oil Level,
Moisture)
Paper Partial Discharge
ExcessivePaperDegradation-
Insulation Health DURd(PaperDegradation-Oil Temp.)
ElectricArc-Insulation Health DURd(Partial Discharge)
PaperDegradation-Insulation Health PaperDegradation-Oil Temp.
Circuit Short Circuit
Deformation-Output Current PAND(Short Circuit,PaperDegradation-Insulation Health)
ExcessivePaperDegradation-
Output Current ExcessivePaperDegradation-Insulation Health
ElectricArc-Output Current ElectricArc-Insulation Health
Winding - Omission-Magn. Flux
OR(Deformation-Circuit.OutputCurrent,
ElectricArc-Circuit.OutputCurrent,
ExcessivePaperDegradation-Circuit.OutputCurrent)
Cooling
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Figure 7. Extended model of the winding subsystem.
occurs either because of winding deformation; electric arc;
or because the paper degradation lasts more than a predefined
period of d time units and reaches an excessive degradation
level. The root causes for excessive paper degradation are oil
moisture, pump failure or low oil level. The winding defor-
mation happens when first the paper degradation event occurs
and then the short circuit failure happens. Finally, the electric
arc occurs as a result of a partial discharge event which lasts
more than a time period of d time units.
The quantification of the FTA model in Figure 8 requires im-
plementing the logic of the gates in Table 1. Since there is no
available solution in HiP-HOPS for the duration gate, we opt
for implementing stochastic Monte Carlo simulations by ex-
tending previous work with Dynamic Fault Trees (Aizpurua,
Muxika, Papadopoulos, Chiacchio, & Manno, 2016) includ-
ing repairable basic events and the duration gate logic.
Winding Failure
Electric Arc
Winding
Deformation
Excessive paper
degradation
Paper degradation
O	

Oil
Moisture
Pump
Fails
Low
Oil
Level
Short
Circuit
Partial
Discharge
Paper
Cooling
Oil
Circuit
Paper
Winding
Figure 8. FTA model of the winding subsystem.
Table 5 displays the failure and repair rates of the basic events
shown in Figure 8 extrapolated from (CIGR ´E, 2015) assum-
ing exponential distributions for failure and repair events. The
duration of the events causing excessive paper degradation
and electric arc are assumed to be 5 and 10 years respectively.
4.2. Fault coverage
For the failure mode study, we take all the failure modes in
the winding FTA model (Figure 8) and assess the criticality
of these failure modes. Making use of the Monte Carlo sim-
ulations for the FTA solution, we have extended the failure
criticality index presented in (Aizpurua et al., 2016) for re-
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Table 5. Failure and repair rates of the analysed failure
modes.
Failure Mode λ (years−1) µ (years−1)
Oil moisture 0.00038 0.25
Pump failure 0.000272 0.25
Low Oil Level 0.000987 0.25
Short Circuit 0.000955 0.25
Partial Discharge 0.0104 0.25
pairable systems.
Table 6 displays ordered failure models with respect to their
criticality and available engineering resources: run-to-failure
data (D), or knowledge of physics of failure equations (K).
Table 6. Ranked failure modes.
Failure Mode
Failure
Criticality
Index
Available
Resources
Exc. Paper Degradation 0.5408 K, D
Electric Arc 0.4331 K, D
Winding Deformation 0.0021 -
Short Circuit 0.0021 -
Partial Discharge 0.0012 K, D
Paper Degradation 1.019e-5 K, D
Low oil 6.052e-6 -
Oil moisture 2.39e-6 -
Pump fail 1.7557e-6 -
As we can see in Table 6 the most critical failure mode is
the excessive paper degradation followed by the electric arc.
Accordingly, we select excessive paper degradation for sub-
sequent prognostics assessment.
4.3. Prognostics Model-selection
According to the prognostics model selection process (cf. Sub-
section 3.3), first we choose a high-level prognostics algo-
rithm group. We focus on model-based approaches because
observation data and knowledge of physics of failure equa-
tions are available (cf. Table 6). We proceed as follows in
the model-selection process with the flowchart in Figure 9
(Aizpurua & Catterson, 2015b):
• The degradation equation and observation data are avail-
able. Besides, the process is Markovian and therefore,
Bayesian tracking solutions are considered.
• The degradation of the transformer aging is not linear.
• There is no need to assume a Gaussian distribution for
the state and noise.
Therefore, we choose the Particle Filter algorithm.
Transformer aging involves deterioration of the paper insu-
lation due to temperature. A model for paper aging is given
in IEEE standard C57.91 (IEEE Power and Energy Society,
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Figure 9. Model-based prognostics algorithm selection.
2011). The standard defines an aging acceleration factor based
on the hotspot temperature. This equation can be rearranged
to give a particle filter process model, by converting it into a
recurrence relation for remaining paper life (Catterson, Mel-
one, & Garcia, 2016):
Lt = Lt−1 − e
15000/383−15000/(273+ΘHt ) + ut (4)
where t is the time index, Lt is the RUL at time t, ΘHt is
hotspot temperature at time t, and ut is the process noise.
Equation (4) is updated with measurement information that is
the hotspot temperature measured by:
ΘHt = Θto + (80−∆Θto/a,R)×K
2m (5)
where m is related to the cooling model of the transformer
and ∆Θto/a,R is the difference in temperature between top
oil and ambient at rated current.
At each simulation step we calculate the degradation state
(Eq. (4)) and the weight of the likelihood of each particle—
please see (Catterson et al., 2016) for more details. Figure 10
shows estimated RUL values at different prediction instants
(Tp) based on the Particle Filter equations and available ob-
servation data (ambient and top oil temperature, load current).
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Figure 10. RUL predictions at different prediction times Tp.
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Transformer RUL predictions results (in months) are as fol-
lows: Tp1 (36m) = 992.5± 2.89m; Tp2 (40m) = 987± 2.64m;
Tp3 (44m) = 984.3± 2.76m; and Tp4 (48m) = 979.3± 3.05m.
4.4. Verification of Prognostics Results
In order to perform the verification of the prognostics appli-
cation we need to take into account the hardware architecture
which acquires the necessary data and calculates prognostics
estimations (cf. Figure 6a, DataArchitectureHW).
For high criticality transformers, a typical data acquisition ar-
chitecture will use temperature and current sensors. Data col-
lection will employ a High-Frequency Network (HFN) where
available (e.g., critical substations), supported by the lower
frequency SCADA network. The SCADA platform includes
a Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) in the substation reporting
to the central Master Station (MS). Both SCADA and higher
frequency data are then archived, using a system such as a PI
Historian. Figure 11 shows the inner architecture of the data
architecture hardware block shown in Figure 6a.
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Figure 11. Transformer data architecture hardware.
According to the verification process defined in Subsection
3.4, we need to identify the failure condition of the data ac-
quisition hardware architecture, i.e., Minimal Cut Set (MCS)
function. To this end, we repeat the process with HiP-HOPS
failure annotations for the data acquisition hardware architec-
ture. Figure 12 shows the FTA model of the data acquisition
hardware architecture.
The MCS equation of the FTA in Figure 12 is as follows:
MCS=PI∨(T1∧T2)∨(I1∧I2)∨[HFN∧(MS∨Net∨RTU)] (6)
where PI indicates the failure of the PI historian, Ti and Ii
indicate the failure of the i-th temperature and current sen-
sor respectively,Net indicates the failure of the network, and
HFN , MS, and RTU indicate the failure of the identified
components. For the analysis we have used hypothetical fail-
ure and repair rates displayed in Table 7.
Taking the prognostics pattern in Figure 5 as a reference, we
use Equations (2) and (3) to evaluate false negative and pos-
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Figure 12. FTA model of the data architecture hardware.
Table 7. Failure and repair rates of the hardware components.
Component λ (years−1) µ (years−1)
PI Historian 0.001 0.25
Ti, Ii, MS, RTU, HFN 0.01 0.25
Network 0.0001 0.25
itive metrics, respectively. For the transformer we have used
the following reliability figures (in months): λasset=1/1038
m-1 (transformer failure rate); µm=0.1 m (maintenance time);
µasset=1 m (repair time); CIFP =10 m; CIFN=4 m, and
SF=4 m (safety factor).
After specifying FP and FN rewards in PRISM using the prop-
erty #4 in Table 3, Figures 13 and 14 show the obtained re-
sults. If the designer has a threshold for an acceptable rate
of false positive or false negative events, it can be identified
whether these values are acceptable or not.
For FP events we have used different prediction results from
Figure 10 including their deviation (see Figure 13). After the
prediction at Tp=Tp2 -deviation, the prognostics predictions
become accurate enough to avoid false positive occurrences.
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Figure 13. False positive event.
For the false negative event we have used the mean RUL pre-
diction value at Tp1 . Figure 14 shows the difference between
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the metric with and without the hardware omission failure ef-
fect. The incorporation of the hardware omission failure en-
ables us to account for the uncertainties that may arise in the
prognostics application environment.
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Figure 14. False negative event.
The failure of the data acquisition hardware architecture causes
a failure to produce a prognostics prediction, which in turn
leads to a non-updated maintenance schedule at the asset level.
We have defined a penalty function using rewards which in-
cludes the effects of downtime (i.e., the asset in a failed state
incurs a penalty of 1 while in maintenance it incurs 0.5), and
false positive and negative events multiplied by the probabil-
ity of failure of the asset under study.
Figure 15 shows the effect of different failure rates of both
the transformer and data acquisition hardware failures. Apart
from the uncertainty arising from the application context, the
specification of the failure rate of the asset (or ground truth)
has uncertainties too. The ground truth is estimated either
under some specific conditions or it is an average failure be-
havior. Therefore when using it as a reference failure model,
uncertainty estimations should be included. In this case study
uncertainty in the ground truth value makes little difference.
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4.5. Update Design Models
The failure specifications of the FTA model in Figure 8 can
be updated dynamically with prognostics prediction results
obtained for the paper degradation model (cf. Figure 10).
To this end, first we approximate the PDF values of the trans-
former degradation prediction with the corresponding distri-
bution. Although the PDFs in Figure 10 can be approximated
with Gaussian or Weibull distributions, the transformer’s pa-
per degradation process is governed by the exponential law
(cf. Eq. (4)). Accordingly, in order to adhere to the real
degradation process, we implement the exponential degrada-
tion law taking the mean and standard deviation values of the
PDFs in Figure 10. Using the resampling mechanism of SAN
we update initial failure rate distributions (cf. Table 5) at dif-
ferent prediction times during the simulation.
Figure 16 shows the obtained system-level health assessment
results updated with prognostics predictions at Tp=3 years
and Tp=4 years for the FTA model shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 16. Winding failure probability.
As shown by Figure 16, prognostics predictions provide an
up-to-date health assessment estimation of the asset under
study including possible changes in the deterioration rate due
to environmental influences. In this case the degradation rate
increases due to the harsh environmental conditions affecting
the paper degradation model in Eq. (4).
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented a novel methodology entitled
ADEPS (Assisted Design for Engineering Prognostic Sys-
tems) for the implementation of a prognostics-centred life-
cycle design process. ADEPS integrates a holistic system-
level design process that includes systems engineering and
reliability engineering concepts through model-based safety
assessment techniques.
In ADEPS importance measurements are implemented to rank
failure modes according to their criticality and aid in the fail-
ure mode selection for prognostics studies. Besides, inte-
grated knowledge engineering and probabilistic model-check-
ing techniques permit systematic prognostics model selec-
tion and exhaustive verification of requirements respectively.
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ADEPS also includes connections between dependability and
prognostics approaches so as to perform system-level health
assessments updated with prognostics prediction results.
ADEPS provides benefits including a reduction of the design
time, complete consideration of prognostics algorithms and
dynamically updated system-level health assessment.
As for our possible future work, we may focus on the imple-
mentation of the following activities:
• Evaluate the performance of ADEPS though different case
studies.
• Complete the verification of requirements integrating other
prognostics metrics.
• Refine the prognostics model selection process analysing
decision points and their possible dynamic organization.
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